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BIANNUAL SURVEY
would be to resort to CPLR 308(4). The court, with little dif-
ficulty, could direct that the summons be both mailed and afflixed or
delivered to the business address or place of abode.34 There would
appear to be nothing unconstitutional or procedurally incorrect with
such substituted service. Section 308(4), thus far, has not been
utilized to any great extent by the practicing bar. This section
could alleviate many of the problems caused by the requirement of
mailing to a "last known residence." 3r
CPLR 308(3): Where CPLR 313 is inapplicable, "last known
residence" construed to embrace only a residence within
the state.
In Durgom v. Durgom, 38 the defendant was a nonresident
and a non-domiciliary. He did, however, maintain a business office
in New York City. Plaintiff's action was based on an alleged
breach of a separation agreement. Plaintiff alleged that the court
acquired personal jurisdiction over the defendant by virtue of the
fact that service was made upon him pursuant to CPLR 308(3).3
The summons was affixed to the door of defendant's place of business
in New York City and a copy was mailed to his California residence.
Defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint was granted on
the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction over his person. In
reaching its conclusion the court stated that unless CPLR 313 was
applicable, the "last known residence" provision of CPLR 308(3),
which requires a mailing to the "last known residence," necessarily
had to be interpreted as meaning a "last known residence" within
the state.38
In the instant case, there was no substantive basis for in per-
sonam or in rem jurisdiction. Breach of a separation agreement
does not give rise to in personam jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary
under CCA § 404 (civil court counterpart of CPLR 302). 39 In
addition, an individual who transacts business in New York is not
subject to in personam jurisdiction under CPLR 302 unless the
cause of action arises out of the business transacted.
As the court noted, there is some authority in support of the
plaintiff's contention that the mere out-of-state mailing to a de-
34 See Timen v. Robinson, (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), 151 N.Y.L.J.,
April 6, 1964, p. 15, col. 1.
35See generally 7B McKI =n's CPLR 308, supp. commentary 77
(1965).
36 47 Misc. 2d 513, 262 N.Y.S.2d 874 (N.Y. City Civil Ct 1965).
37 CPLR 308(3) is made applicable to the civil court via operation of
Section 403 of the Civil Court Act.
33 Durgom v. Durgom, 47 Misc. 2d 513, 516-17, 262 N.Y.S.2d 874, 878-79(N.Y. City Civil Ct 1965).
39 See Willis v. Willis, 42 Misc. 2d 473, 248 N.Y.S.2d 260 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1964).
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fendant's "last known residence" could result in personal jurisdiction
over him.40  However, various factors tend to indicate that it
was the intent of the legislature, in enacting CPLR 308, to limit
the mailing of process within the state, unless there was some sub-
stantive basis for acquiring in personam jurisdiction over the
non-domiciliary defendant. 1 One such factor is that the predecessor
sections to CPLR,308(3) indicated clearly that the mailing must
be within the state.42 In addition, since the legislative notes and
reports on the CPLR make no mention of an out-of-state mailing,4 3
it would appear that the legislature was making no attempt to
change the established law as found under the CPA.44
CPLR 308(3) is a mere device to effectuate service when such
service under 308(1) cannot be made with due diligence. The
nature of CPLR 308(1) indicates an underlying basis for in
personam jurisdiction (physical presence within the state). To say
that service of process under 308(3) can in and of itself be
utilized as a basis for acquiring in personamn jurisdiction where
the defendant is not physically present, but merely has a place of
business within the state, without the cause of action arising from
such business, would be "stretching the constitutional requirements
of due process to its [sic] outermost limits." 45 It might even exceed
those bounds.
CPLR 308(3): Claim interposed for purpose of statute of limitations
when summons served pursuant to statute-not when filed.
In Browning v. Nix,46 plaintiff delivered the summons to the
Sheriff of Erie County thereby effecting a sixty-day extension of the
statute of limitations, as provided by CPLR 203(b) (4). There-
after, plaintiff utilized substituted service pursuant to CPLR 308(3).
However, plaintiff did not file proof of the substituted service, as
required by CPLR 308(3), until such time that both the statute of
limitations and the CPLR 203(b) (4) sixty-day extension had
expired. Therefore, the defendant argued that even though sub-
stituted service was effected during the sixty-day extension, since
40 See, e.g, Timen v. Robinson, (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), 151 N.Y.L.J.,
April 6, 1964, p. 15, col. 1; 7B McKnxNEY's CPLR 308, supp. commentary
77 (1965).
41 Cf. CPLR 313-16; CCA §§ 404-08.
42 See CPA § 230.
45 See SECOND REP. 156; FnTHm REP. 266.
44 "It is a sound inference that in the absence of express language indicating
its intention, it is presumed that the Legislature did not intend to overturn
long standing rules of law." McKINNEY's SrTtrTsS § 74.
45 Durgom v. Durgom, supra note 38, at 516, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 878.
46 47 Misc. 2d 709, 263 N.Y.S.2d 42 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1965).
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